TestSealOpenRoundtrip scanned the whole ~36-byte sealed frame for the
plaintext with bytes.Contains(sealed, pt). For the 1-byte case ("x"),
any of the ~29 random bytes (nonce+ciphertext+tag) equalling that byte
tripped the assertion, so it failed ~11% of runs (1-(255/256)^29).
Living on main, that spuriously failed ~11% of CI runs.
Replace the probabilistic per-byte scan with a deterministic check that
the sealed frame is never the bare plaintext (it always carries the
header+nonce+tag, so it differs in both length and content). The
round-trip Open(Seal(x)) == x assertion is unchanged. Verbatim-leak
coverage already lives deterministically in TestNoPlaintextLeak, which
uses a multi-byte marker where a chance match is negligible.
Test-only change; no production code touched.
Verified: go test ./internal/crypto/... -count=100 passes; the
previously-flaky test passes 500 consecutive runs; go vet ./... clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implement the storage path: for each accepted report, scrub PII (#8),
encrypt with AES-256-GCM (ADR #5), and write only ciphertext to R2, wired
in as the real ingest Sink replacing NopSink.
- internal/crypto: AES-256-GCM in the exact ADR #5 wire format
(magic "LMB1" || version || key_id BE16 || nonce(12) || ct || tag(16);
the 7-byte header is the GCM AAD). Provider-independent framing shared by
a host crypto/aes+crypto/cipher impl (tests, devserver) and a Wasm
SubtleCrypto impl (syscall/js, //go:build js && wasm) per the TinyGo
constraint; both produce byte-identical frames. Versioned keyring with
key_id rotation; ParseKeyring reads the Secrets Store JSON secret.
- internal/storage: ObjectStore interface with an in-memory fake (tests,
devserver) and a Wasm R2Store (syumai/workers R2 binding). Sink ties
scrub -> Seal -> Put under a unique reports/<ts>-<rand> key. WorkerSink
loads the keyring from Secrets Store (BUGREPORT_ENC_KEYRING), cached for
the isolate lifetime.
- handler.New now takes an injectable ingest.Sink; the Worker uses the real
R2/Secrets-Store sink, the devserver a memory + throwaway-key sink.
- wrangler.jsonc: add REPORTS_BUCKET (R2) and BUGREPORT_ENC_KEYRING
(Secrets Store) bindings.
Tests (host, no TinyGo): encrypt/decrypt roundtrip; ciphertext != plaintext;
wrong key + tamper (ct/tag/nonce/header-AAD) fail; exact wire layout plus a
known-answer vector; key_id rotation with retained keys; full sink path (PII
scrubbed then encrypted, readback requires the key and yields the scrubbed
content). Existing ingest/handler behavior preserved (202 on valid POST).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>