Gitea/vm/config/Caddyfile.tmpl

# Rendered by vm/bootstrap.sh -> /etc/caddy/Caddyfile
#
# Two compile-time plugins are doing the work here:
#
#   googleclouddns -- ACME DNS-01, so issuance and renewal never need inbound 80
#   coraza_waf     -- OWASP Coraza with the Core Rule Set embedded in the binary
{
	email ${ACME_EMAIL}
	admin 127.0.0.1:2019
	# Required by coraza-caddy: Caddy has no built-in ordering for a third-party
	# directive, and the WAF must run before anything that could act on the
	# request. Applies inside handle blocks too.
	order coraza_waf first
}

${DOMAIN} {
	tls {
		dns googleclouddns {
			# Application Default Credentials come from the GCE metadata server.
			# The VM service account holds roles/dns.admin scoped to this zone only.
			gcp_project {env.GCP_PROJECT}
		}
		# Only used for propagation checks. If issuance stalls waiting for
		# propagation, this is the knob to turn.
		resolvers 8.8.8.8 8.8.4.4
	}

	encode zstd gzip

	# Governs the git/LFS branch below. The WAF branch has its own, much smaller,
	# SecRequestBodyLimit -- they apply to different routes and are not a mismatch
	# to be "fixed".
	request_body {
		max_size 512MB
	}

	# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
	# Git transport and LFS: deliberately NOT behind the WAF.
	#
	# Packfiles are binary and trip CRS's SQLi/XSS rules constantly, and
	# coraza.conf-recommended's SecRequestBodyLimit would reject any push
	# larger than ~12MB outright. Running CRS here does not harden anything;
	# it just breaks git. Authentication still applies -- Gitea does that.
	# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
	@gittransport path_regexp ^/[^/]+/[^/]+/(?:info/refs|git-upload-pack|git-receive-pack|HEAD|objects/.*|info/lfs(?:/.*)?)$
	handle @gittransport {
		reverse_proxy ${GITEA_UPSTREAM} {
			transport http {
				read_timeout 900s
				write_timeout 900s
			}
		}
	}

	# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
	# Everything else -- web UI and API -- goes through the WAF.
	# ---------------------------------------------------------------------
	handle {
		coraza_waf {
			load_owasp_crs
			directives `
			Include @coraza.conf-recommended
			Include @crs-setup.conf.example
			Include @owasp_crs/*.conf

			# DetectionOnly logs what it would have blocked without blocking.
			# The fail2ban jail is enabled ONLY when this is On -- banning on
			# detections that were never blocks would turn a false positive
			# into an nftables ban, which is worse than the 403 it avoided.
			SecRuleEngine ${WAF_MODE}

			# Inspecting responses on a git host costs CPU and catches nothing
			# worth catching.
			SecResponseBodyAccess Off

			# Truncate-and-inspect rather than reject: a large but legitimate
			# attachment upload should not 413 because the WAF gave up.
			SecRequestBodyLimitAction ProcessPartial

			# RelevantOnly, not On. Auditing every request would pour the full
			# request volume into journald and then into Cloud Logging.
			SecAuditEngine RelevantOnly

			# The default relevant-status is ^(?:5|4(?!04)), which audits every
			# 401 -- and on a public git host unauthenticated API and web probes
			# produce those constantly. That noise would bury the would-be blocks
			# this log exists to surface. Narrowed to real WAF refusals and
			# server errors; rule-triggered transactions are still audited on
			# severity regardless of status, which is what keeps DetectionOnly
			# useful.
			SecAuditLogRelevantStatus "^(?:5[0-9]{2}|403)$"

			SecAuditLog /dev/stdout
			SecAuditLogFormat json
			SecAuditLogParts ABIJDEFHZ
			`
		}

		reverse_proxy ${GITEA_UPSTREAM} {
			transport http {
				read_timeout 900s
				write_timeout 900s
			}
		}
	}

	log {
		output stderr
		format json
	}
}