3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
JMR-devandClaude Opus 5.5 ec4de0c6c4 Run Gitea Actions jobs on a dedicated GKE cluster
gitea:runnersEnabled creates a zonal GKE Standard cluster, used for
nothing else, running the official gitea/runner image in rootless
Docker-in-Docker, so workflows can `docker build`. Off by default; with
the gate off the stack only gains the container API.

- private spot nodes, egress through Cloud NAT on a static IP; control
  plane reachable only through its IAM-gated DNS endpoint
- the registration token is a Secret Manager secret created by
  scripts/bootstrap.sh; Gitea reads it from a file, the runner pod
  mounts it through the Secret Manager CSI add-on with Workload
  Identity. Pulumi never sees the value
- a NetworkPolicy keeps job containers off the metadata server and
  private ranges, so jobs hold no GCP identity
- Caddy routes /api/actions, /api/actions_pipeline and the artifact
  service around the WAF (protobuf and PUT/PATCH uploads); fail2ban
  ignores the NAT address
- docs/runners.md: threat model, cost, enable/disable, token rotation

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-15 19:31:15 +07:00
JMR-devandClaude Opus 5.5 973c1bbcd3 Keep the ACME contact email in Secret Manager
gitea:acmeEmail sat in Pulumi.prod.yaml, which this public repository
publishes, and was then copied into instance metadata. It now lives in a
gitea-acme-email secret instead, read by the VM when it renders the
Caddyfile.

- scripts/bootstrap.sh creates the secret empty and prints how to set
  it, the same as github-pat: the address is chosen, not generated.
- Pulumi grants the VM secretAccessor on it and nothing more. It is kept
  out of secrets.Names, whose members also get secretVersionAdder and are
  mapped to `gitea generate secret` by vm/bootstrap.sh.
- The gitea:acmeEmail config key and the acme-email metadata entry are
  gone.
- vm/bootstrap.sh renders the whole `email` directive. If the secret is
  unreadable it renders a comment instead and warns: Caddy still issues
  certificates under an account with no contact address, whereas an
  empty `email` would fail to parse and leave nothing serving TLS. Same
  directive-or-comment pattern as CADDY_PUBLISH_PORTS and CADDY_SYSCTL.

README setup gains the secret step, plus two that were missing: ADC
login (Pulumi's GCS backend and provider do not use the gcloud login),
and exporting PULUMI_CONFIG_PASSPHRASE from Secret Manager before
`stack init`. Without the latter, init prompts for a new passphrase and
the stack is encrypted with a key Cloud Build's infra trigger never sees.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-10 04:04:18 -05:00
JMR-devandClaude Opus 5 c0382d5d31 Gitea on GCE: podman quadlets, Pulumi, Cloud Build
Self-hosted Gitea on a single e2-small AlmaLinux 10 VM in us-east1,
serving gitea.jasonmross.dev.

Runtime is podman quadlets (systemd .container/.network/.volume units).
Both images are built on Debian 13: Gitea from a GPG-verified release
binary, and Caddy from an xcaddy build carrying the Google Cloud DNS
provider (ACME DNS-01) and the Coraza WAF with the OWASP CRS embedded.

Infrastructure is a Pulumi program in Go against a GCS state backend.
Cloud Build handles CI: a push trigger for images, one for infra, and a
weekly scheduled rebuild. Everything Cloud Build touches is 2nd gen.

Notable design decisions, each documented where it lives:

- Quadlets track a floating :prod tag. AutoUpdate=registry compares
  digests for a tag, so a digest-pinned image silently disables
  auto-updates.
- Git transport and LFS bypass the WAF. With the bypass removed, a plain
  git push returns 403 -- packfiles trip CRS reliably.
- gitea:wafMode drives both SecRuleEngine and whether the fail2ban jail
  acting on WAF verdicts exists. Banning on detections that were never
  blocks would turn a tuning false positive into an nftables ban.
- fail2ban bans at the nftables prerouting hook. Published container
  ports are DNAT'd and never traverse INPUT, where the stock actions
  install their rules.
- The DNS zone, backup bucket, and Gitea signing secrets are not
  Pulumi-owned, so pulumi destroy cannot take them with it.
- The podman subnet is pinned because it is what Gitea's
  REVERSE_PROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES names.

Three update layers: dnf5-automatic for the OS, podman-auto-update with
health-gated rollback for containers, and a weekly image rebuild that
gives the second layer something to pull.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 21:45:33 -05:00